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of Carlyle's characterizations and far more convincing. Valuable, too, are his accounts of Spanish political leaders of the period. Hay's friendships, too, especially his relations with the circle of Washington friends which included Henry Adams and Clarence King, are extraordinarily rich in the kind of self-expression that possesses something of universal appeal; the letters of Hay and his friends are in an unusual degree both intimate and publishable. A later series of letters gives a singularly attractive and warmly lifelike picture of Theodore Roosevelt as his friend John Hay saw him. Wit, insight, political comment animated and penetrating, abound in the *Letters*, and in whatever Hay earnestly wrote there is a sense of reality such as lesser minds never reach.

Finally the *Life and Letters* shows us John Hay as a statesman; it reveals his attitude regarding the first Canal treaty and the later revolution in Panama; it gives something of his intimate feelings and opinions in relation to the Chinese contest which culminated in the most brilliant triumph of his career; it proves Hay's early understanding of what Mr. Thayer calls "the German menace." This part of the *Life*, as we said, does not pretend to be political history; but it does show statesmanship in action and it enables us to see the human side of a great statesman.

The most distinctive feature of the *Life and Letters* is, perhaps, the sense it gives of the time-spirit as transmitted through the personality of one man. John Hay's life seems to epitomize the inward feeling of the period through which he lived. It is a period of transition and of disturbed consciousness. Provincial Americanism gives way to cosmopolitan feeling; there appears to be a struggle between Puritan steadfastness and the romantic spirit—a struggle that tended to result in what is sometimes inaccurately called "bad conscience," a sense of inward differences. It may be that in attempting to read such meanings through the life-story of John Hay one generalizes without due warrant or misinterprets the meaning of certain elements in the *Life* itself: certainly Hay's occasional fits of depression and a noticeable casualness in a part of his life should not be overstressed as elements of his character. But the fact that the *Life and Letters* tempts one, far more than do most biographies, to this kind of generalization, testifies to the existence in it of deep personal and social significances.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE. By Douglas Clyde Macintosh, Ph.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915.

The sane view of philosophy and metaphysics would seem to be that these are not bodies of truths that require to be demonstrated before men may believe in the evidence of their senses or permit themselves to have faith in any reality behind appearances; but that

they are really efforts to draw nearer to a presupposed reality. The effort of philosophy is just an extension of the effort of common sense and of science, and at one time in the evolutions of human intelligence what we now call common sense must have been metaphysical. If this be true, man as a thinker in the ordinary sense is justified in taking for granted the reality presupposed in both the effort of common sense and the effort of philosophy; but man as a philosopher may not presuppose anything. Man as a philosopher is engaged—*pace* the Positivists—in an effort to enlarge the sphere of human knowledge, to attain to a new level of consciousness—an effort just as inevitable and just as legitimate as was that of common sense. It is true that the philosopher leaves his faith behind him—just as the poet or mystic, each in his own way engaged in a similar attempt, seems frequently to leave his five wits behind him;—but this is the necessary condition that results from the very nature of the problem. It would seem unreasonable, then, to allow the skepticism of philosophers to shape our practical faith, for this skepticism is a method rather than a result. But the philosopher himself must be held to his method; in him faith is dogmatism. One's estimate of a philosopher, according to this view, should be based first upon his method and secondarily upon his results. The opinion that his work is useless because no definite results consistent with the method employed can be shown is indefensible.

As a fundamental critique of nearly every philosophical doctrine since Kant, Professor Macintosh's book *The Problem of Knowledge* is admirable. The author's method of inquiry is systematic and clear, his attitude impartial, his logic searching. All theories of knowledge are either idealistic or realistic, and at the same time either dualistic or monistic. The chief combinations of these doctrines in modern times are epistemological dualism and realism, epistemological monism and realism, and epistemological monism and idealism. Each of the main schools thus designated may be divided into smaller groups for purposes of logical analysis. Thus idealists are either logical idealists, mystical idealists or psychological idealists; or, as is often the case, their doctrines partake of more than one of these forms of idealism. Approaching the matter in this methodical fashion the author is able to treat of each philosopher in adequate detail without blurring the outlines of his larger argument.

All forms of idealism Professor Macintosh believes to be vitiated by argument from what R. B. Perry has called "the ego-centre predicament." It is true, as the idealists urge, that "we can never be conscious of any object that is not in the relation of object of consciousness to ourselves as subject"; but, as Mr. Perry and Professor Macintosh point out, "this fact proves nothing at all as to whether there are or not other objects not in conscious relation to ourselves or to any conscious subject." Through every form of idealistic doctrine concerning the nature of knowledge the author

traces the fundamental fallacy with a perspicuity and fairness that make his work a delight to the logically-minded reader.

The combination of dualism with realism is likewise subjected to a penetrating criticism, with the result that all forms of this doctrine are shown either to end in agnosticism or to avoid such a conclusion only through dogmatism. A philosopher who gives a remarkably satisfactory account of the problem of knowledge, "under the self-imposed limits of epistemological dualism," is Vokelt. Yet Vokelt is obliged to rest his assertion that we possess trans-subjective knowledge upon "intuitive certainty," or upon the "necessities of thought." The very satisfactoriness of Vokelt's discussion thus reveals the unsatisfactoriness of the dualism of his epistemology. Similarly Dr. G. T. Ladd is accused of dogmatism on the ground that "he asserts the fact of ontological knowledge on the basis of the right to know, and despite a critical view that would naturally lead to ontological agnosticism."

With the Neo-realists Professor Macintosh has more in common than with the other schools whose theories he criticises, for the Neo-realists, he believes, are essentially right in maintaining the immediate awareness of independent reality in normal human experience. But they cannot be acquitted, he seeks to prove, of an undue dogmatism with reference to the extent to which that which is presented to consciousness is real independently of consciousness. Ideally this doctrine denies any difference between the object as presented and as independently real, and in so doing it has to maintain that consciousness, as a relation, is absolutely external, or that if it is viewed as a mental activity it produces nothing. In this way the Neo-realists have encountered serious difficulties—difficulties which the author reduces to their simplest and most obvious forms with mathematical precision.

Having thus pointed out the logical predicaments in which almost every possible variety of belief concerning the problem of knowledge involves its defenders, Professor Macintosh advances his own view—the belief that the primary qualities of physical things are independently real and are independently known, but that the secondary qualities, or "sense qualities," are subjective. By means of this view, which he calls "*critical realistic monism*," he keeps clear of the twin undesirables, idealism with its fallacious basis and dualism with its necessary agnosticism, and at the same time he frees himself from the tangle of contradictions with which the Neo-realists have to struggle. The author maintains a similar point of view with regard to the morphology of knowledge, and later, in the part of his treatise which is devoted to the problem of mediate knowledge, develops a view which he calls "*critical monism in logical theory*"—a view which seems to retain what is good and defensible in current pragmatism while so modifying the pragmatic definition of truth as to render it secure against the imputation of fallacy. In substance,

Professor Macintosh's revised pragmatic definition of truth is that real truth is practical identity of idea with reality, of predicate with subject, where the practice in question is ultimately satisfactory, as well as the mental instrument which serves it.

The lay mind naturally inclines to philosophers who offer it the assurance of real knowledge, whether this assurance be based upon a fallacious idealism or upon mere dogmatism. What matters it, thinks the lay mind, if Dr. Ladd, for example, abandons in strictness his rôle as a philosopher to give us a dogmatic assurance of the reality of knowledge? In what way is the adoption of Professor Macintosh's relatively simple theory *without dogmatism* preferable to Dr. Ladd's theory *with faith* since neither theory seems capable of proof in the ordinary sense, each being in the nature of a hypothesis entertained because human thought cannot rest satisfied without having an hypothesis of some sort with regard to the problem of knowledge? But the critical philosopher, engaged upon his important special problem, recognizes that there is real progress in the setting forth of a theory of knowledge free from logical fallacy and in no way implying agnosticism. Such a theory Professor Macintosh appears to have constructed.

IS THERE A SHAKESPEARE PROBLEM? By G. G. Greenwood, M.P.
New York: John Lane Company, 1915.

Mr. Greenwood is one of the doughtiest warriors who have engaged in the controversy, originally raised by the Baconians, as to the identity of the Shakespeare of the biographies with the author of the immortal plays. Seven years ago he published a work entitled *The Shakespeare Problem Restated* which called forth replies from Mr. J. M. Robertson and from the late Andrew Lang, of whom the former appears to have attacked Mr. Greenwood's book with a good deal of bitterness while the latter maintained his customary suavity and good-humor. Mr. Greenwood now returns to the fray with the volume entitled *Is There a Shakespeare Problem?*

Since this volume contains practically the whole of Mr. Greenwood's argument in its final form, it is a pity that the author should have felt it necessary to make the work so largely controversial. In the trench-fighting between the author and Mr. Robertson, positions are captured and retaken in a manner that is somewhat confusing and in the end proves wearisome. Though Mr. Greenwood seems to keep his temper and never loses his sense of humor, his sallies of wit hardly compensate for the tedium incident to long arguments about alleged misquotations and misrepresentations.

This unfortunate fact, however, has no real bearing, of course, upon the merits of Mr. Greenwood's argument. And on its merits this argument undoubtedly deserves to be read. It is of distinct advantage that the facts of the Shakespeare problem should be thor-